Has Ruben A. Bühner solved the morphē theou problem?

Generative AI summary:

In Messianic High Christology: New Testament Variants of Second Temple Judaism (2021), Ruben A. Bühner argues that high Christology aligns with Jewish messianism. He examines Philippians 2:6-11, comparing it with Qumran texts. Bühner critiques traditional views on “morphē theou” (form of God), rejecting interpretations of divine essence and emphasizing visible appearance and status. He views Christ’s metamorphosis as a rejection of divine status for human form. The reviewer disputes Bühner’s claims, suggesting Jesus’ actions reflect Jewish ascetic humility. The text ultimately presents Jesus’ rejection of godlike status and embrace of servitude as a model for believers.

 

Read time: 9 minutes

In his book Messianic High Christology: New Testament Variants of Second Temple Judaism (2021), Ruben Bühner sets out to demonstrate that a high christology is compatible with Jewish messianism. The title says it all. The title may turn out to be a contradiction in terms.

Chapter one looks at Philippians 2:6-11, probably the key New Testament text for a high christology, comparing it with two Qumran texts, which Bühner thinks have some bearing on how we locate the second stanza of the encomium in the thought-world of second temple Judaism. As far as I can see, he offers no Jewish messianic premise for the first stanza. In fact, he will argue that the linguistic and conceptual background for the metamorphosis from “form of God” to “form of a slave,” and so on, is Greek. A good start, at least.

I came across Bühner’s book only recently—I wasn’t aware of it when I was working on In the Form of a God: The Pre-existence of the Exalted Christ in Paul. So let’s have a look at what he has to say about the expression morphē theou—just in case I’ve missed something important.

Some arguments about morphē theou

Bühner makes the point, first, that the genitive theou, without the article, is ambiguous: ‘Thus, in Phil 2:6 it remains grammatically vague if we should interpret μορφή θεοῦ as Christ being in the “μορφή of a god” or in the “μορφή of (the one) God”’ (26). Since no other beings are called “god” in the context, however, he is inclined to think that this is the “one God” of Jewish belief.

He then briefly outlines and passes judgment on four main ways in which scholars have understood the phrase. He will propose a combination of the third and fourth approaches “in light of Second Temple messianism,” though, as I say, I don’t see where the messianism comes into it.

1. Morphē has been taken to be the semantic equivalent of eikōn, which is the Greek word for “image” : so Christ is depicted as being the first of a new humanity “in the image of God” (cf. Gen. 1:26-27 LXX); he was obedient where Adam was disobedient. But Bühner says that “there is no real linguistic link between μορφή [morphē] in Phil 2:6 and the creation narrative” (27). I agree.

2. Scholars have suggested that morphē really means “essence” or “that which truly characterizes a given reality.” The ontological assumption has been key for trinitarian hypothesising and goes back a long way. In the fourth century, Gregory of Nyssa wrote:

Now, he who ‘is in the form of God’… is not shaped by any stamp other than the Father, since he is the stamp of the Father’s being (hypostaseōs); for the form of God is surely the same as his being (ousia). When he was born in the form of a slave…, he was conformed to the being (ousia) of a slave, not taking upon himself the mere form divorced from the being (ousia), but the essential being (ousia) is indicated at the same time as the form; just so, surely, the writer who said he was in the form of God indicated the being (ousia) through the form. (Against Eunomius 3.2.147)1

Bühner says, however, that there is little evidence that morphē was understood in this way before the christological debates of the third and fourth centuries. In fact, it seems to me that Gregory is implicitly working against the obvious sense of the word: in effect, morphē in this case must mean “being”—even if it normally doesn’t—because Jesus is the “stamp” of the Father’s hypostasis.

I would add that it has sometimes been claimed that morphē has this meaning in earlier philosophical writings (Plato, Aristotle), but as far as I can tell, the proper distinction between ousia (“essence,” “being”) or hylē (‘matter,” “substance”) and morphē (“form,” “outward appearance”) is always maintained.2

3. This is the interesting one in my view: ‘in accordance with most uses of this lexeme within Greek literature, it is translated as “form” or “shape” and refers first of all to the visible appearance of Christ’ (27). This is exactly right, but Bühner then takes it to mean that the transformation described in Philippians 2:6-8 has been construed as an epiphany or metamorphosis: “Christ would take on a human appearance just as Zeus can appear as bovine in the Europa myth, but Christ would in fact always remain a god rather than becoming human” (28).

The objection to this, he says, is that it doesn’t do justice to the “earthly and human existence of Christ,” who suffered and was crucified—incarnation, kenōsis, and suffering fall entirely outside the pagan epiphanic paradigm. Correct, but there is a better of reading the metamorphosis trope, which happily preserves the proper sense of morphē theou, which we will get to.

4. The juxtaposition of “form of God” and “form of a slave” suggests the meaning “status,” by which Bühner understands “the social rank an individual holds in terms of authority, power, and esteem” (28-29). So Christ “emptied himself” in the sense that he exchanged the status of God for the status of a slave. The emphasis on visible appearance is retained inasmuch as “the change of status can be connected with the change of someone’s appearance” (30). I presume Bühner means that the word morphē still plays on the idea of a “metamorphosed god” but that Paul’s argument goes beyond this in two ways:

First, it lays much more weight on the human and earthly existence of Christ, who “empties himself” and finally even dies. Second, the argumentative focus lies more on Christ’s selfless change of status than on the change of his visible appearance. (30)

So this is Bühner’s own position, but I don’t think he has succeeded in establishing a notion of Christ’s pre-existence “in the form of God” compatible with first century Jewish thought. So I will restate my own solution at the end.

Some arguments against Bühner’s interpretation

1. There are other proposals which Bühner does not mention: that Jesus was in the form of the massive body of God (Gieschen), or of a pre-existent apocalyptic messiah (Horbury) or Son of Man (Holloway), or of an angel (Vollenweider).

2. To be clear, morphē does not mean “status.” It denotes the outward appearance of a person or object. So “form of God” means “status of God” only by association: Jesus was in a form which by association could be understood to signify divine status. The question remains open: what was the actual form of this “god”—in contrast to the “form of a slave,” which arguably has something to do with the appearance of his degrading death?

3. Bühner cites scholarly support for the status interpretation but does not give a single example of a text in which this meaning holds. Hellerman has defended the view but only by introducing clothing as the outward marker of status. So Jesus was in the form of God in the sense that he appeared clothed in the glory of God.3

4. The grammatical ambiguity holds if we take tou theou in isolation, but morphē theou in context is theologically unambiguous: the one God of Israel does not have a form; only the pagan gods have forms.

5. The phrase morphē theou looks very much at home in Hellenistic pagan discourse, but it does not necessarily point to an epiphany or metamorphosis. In fact, I would say that it does not imply that. It could be said quite properly that a god took the form of a slave—that’s a metamorphosis. But to be “in the form of a god” is not to be a god in the first place. Rather, a human person, who was perceived to be “in the form of a god,” chose a very different path and was found actually to be merely and vulnerably human, in the form of a slave.

6. In this respect, the emphasis on status is apposite. The encomium tracks the dramatic shifts in the public estimation of Jesus from a Greek point of view: he appeared at first sight to be a wonder-worker in the form of a god, but he rejected the opportunity, when it was presented to him, to fulfil the imperialistic potential of that sonship, and instead suffered a humiliating death on a Roman cross; but God exalted him, raising his name or reputation or authority in the Greek world, to the extent that it became a realistic expectation that every knee would bow, etc., to the glory of the God of Israel—exactly the sort of conversion of an idolatrous civilisation to a just monotheism envisaged in Isaiah 45:22-46:2. Praise, dispraise, and praise.

7. Bühner is right to humanise the self-emptying, but in that case it is difficult to see how the transition can happen between a heavenly pre-existence, in whatever form, and an earthly existence. Does the divine person Jesus become incarnate and then empty himself? My argument is that the kenōsis draws on a model of Jewish asceticism, perhaps in popular usage, illustrated by Philo’s explanation of why God gave the commandments to Israel in the wilderness: Moses “led away (his people) from the harmful customs of the cities into the wilderness that he might empty (kenōsei) their souls of unrighteous deeds” (Decalogue 13). Significantly, the reason is that people had “given form to” (μορφώσαντες) an infinite variety of images and statues and had shown them “honours equal to the Olympians (isolympious) and equal to the gods” (isotheous) (7).

The whole point…

Bühner goes on to say that the notion of Christ’s pre-existence is not only found elsewhere in Paul (1 Cor. 8:6; 10:4; 2 Cor. 8:9), it is crucial for his argument in Philippians 2:1-11.

In v. 3 Paul demands, “Do nothing from selfish ambition or conceit, but in humility regard others as better than yourselves.” Within the argumentative structure of the letter, the following passage of Phil 2:6-11 is then used as an example for the Philippians’ behavior. Yet without Christ’s existence before his earthly life, Paul could not use Jesus’ selfless humiliation as an exhortation to the Philippians within his paraenesis.

Bühner, Ruben A. Messianic High Christology: New Testament Variants of Second Temple Judaism. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2021, 31.

But how does such a metamorphosis, from form of God to form of a slave, work as a model to be emulated by your ordinary human Philippian believer? If, as I argue, a tradition relating to the temptation in the wilderness lies behind the opening lines of the encomium, we have an excellent example of a person who does not exploit charismatic power and authority for personal gain, who does not act out of “selfish ambition” and “vainglory.”

So what I think we have is an encomium, composed from a Greek perspective, which captures the acute dilemma at the heart of Jesus’ career as a Spirit-empowered prophet-messiah. He would have appeared to the Greek onlooker as a person “in the form of a god,” but he resisted the satanically inspired allure of the ruler cult, emptied himself of such self-serving ambition in the wilderness, and took instead the “form of a slave,” becoming all too human and mortal.

Samuel Conner | Tue, 04/01/2025 - 12:55 | Permalink

Thank you, Andrew.

Perhaps one could also see a second point in Jesus’ “career” at which he declined to seize opportunity for self-exaltation — there seems to be a “course change” in the Synoptic narrative at Peter’s confession that Jesus is YHWH’s Messiah, His anointed king over Israel. It is at this point in the story that the path of suffering and death at the hands of the Romans becomes explicit. Peter’s counsel against this path and Jesus’ harsh response to it may be a kind of echo of Jesus’ wilderness temptation. 

I wonder whether one could see a final opportunity to turn back from the path of suffering in the last hours, when the onlookers at the Crucifixion wondered why Jesus, having saved so many others, did not save himself.  I privately suspect that Jesus may, on the Cross, have asked the Father (who previously had always heard and granted Jesus’ requests) to rescue him. Perhaps the Cry of Dereliction was an anguished realization that this request would not be granted.

@Samuel Conner:

Agreed. There’s also the moment in Gethsemane. The opening of the encomium would then be a condensation of a dilemma that runs through his career from baptism to crucifixion, though we lose the focus on rule over the nations. The “post-pagan” interest is less in Jesus as a servant to the circumcised than in the prospect that the root of Jesse will rule the nations (cf. Rom. 15:8-12).

Hi Andrew,

Out of curiosity, have you read Crispin Fletcher-Louis’s book on the Philippian hymn, entitled “The Divine Heartset”?  If so, I’d like to hear your assessment.  

Also, do you address Col. 2:9 on your blog?  

@Andrew Perriman:

Hi Andrew,

While you’re waiting for the book to arrive, you may find this article interesting, by the same author on the same subject:  

(3) ‘The Being that is in a Manner Equal with God’ (Phil. 2:6c): A Self-Transforming, Incarnational, Divine Ontology

I’m looking forward to your post on Col. 2:9.  To give you a hint about my understanding of the text, I think an interpretative key is the use of κατοικεῖ.  If you look at every other text in the New Testament in which that term is used, you may notice how that which “dwells” in various places is never an inherent ontological attribute of those places.  

~Sean

@Andrew Perriman:

Hi Andrew,

As I was pondering Col. 2:9 some time back, I was struck by the quirkiness of using “dwells” for what many assume are inherent ontological properties.  So, I set Col. 1:19 and 2:9 aside and took a look at the other texts in the New Testament in which κατοικεῖ appears, and I noticed something interesting, but not unexpected.

Matthew 12:45: Then he goes and takes with him seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and they enter and dwell [κατοικεῖ] there.

Luke 11:26: Then he goes and takes with him seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and they enter and dwell [κατοικεῖ] there.

Acts 7:48: However, the Most High does not dwell [κατοικεῖ] in temples made with hands

Acts 17:24: God, who made the world and everything in it, since He is Lord of heaven and earth, does not dwell [κατοικεῖ] in temples made with hands.

2 Peter 3:13: Nevertheless we, according to His promise, look for new heavens and a new earth in which righteousness dwells [κατοικεῖ].

Revelation 2:13: I know your works, and where you dwell [κατοικεῖς], where Satan’s throne is. And you hold fast to My name, and did not deny My faith even in the days in which Antipas was My faithful martyr, who was killed among you, where Satan dwells [κατοικεῖ].

Did you notice something interesting about every one of these uses of “dwells”? That which dwells in various places is never an inherent ontological property of those places.

You could express it this way:

A dwells in P, but A is not an inherent ontological property of P.

Or you could universalize it this way:

Whenever we see that A dwells in P, we can assume that A is not an inherent ontological property of P.

If κατοικεῖ at Col. 2:9 is understood the same way as these other texts, then Col. 1:19 makes perfect sense, as does Eph. 3:19. On the other hand, if we assume, as most if not all Trinitarians seem to assume, that Col. 2:9 is speaking of inherent ontological properties, then it seems incompatible with Col. 1:19 and the NT use of κατοικεῖ.

A friend of mine put Paul’s intent well, IMO, and there is probably overlap with your view: 

“…ought not to search for access to the divine realm outside of Christ, because, the fullness of the divine quality dwells in Christ, God was well pleased to have the fullness dwell in Christ, and therefore, the only access to the divine is through Christ. One could therefore paraphrase verse 19 of the CSH as saying that God was well pleased to designate Christ as the one through whom mankind can fully access God, since the divine presence dwells in him just as it did the temple. The fullness dwelling in Christ, that God is pleased to have dwell in him, is the fullness of what it means to access the divine, and the audience of the Colossian epistle can have this same fullness in Christ.” (The English translation is the author’s own. The original is in Italian, found in Capitolo X: Immagine del Dio invisibile, Il Dio Della Bibbia, edited by Francesco Arduini, Santena: Land University Press, 2022), 378-380. The entire chapter is on pages 351-385.

Moses went to the mountain where God dwelt to experience the divine, just as Israelites went to the temple where God dwelt to experience the divine, yet neither the mountain nor the temple were themselves God. Jesus has replaced the mountain and the temple, and it is to him and his “body” (the church) that Christians go to experience the divine. Though he and his body also are not God, they are nevertheless the ‘place’ where we meet his God and our God.

@Sean Kasabuske:

Sure. When katoikeō is used literally, there is no ontological confusion or overlap between the person who dwells and the place in which the person dwells.

In the LXX, YHWH dwells (katoikeō) either in heaven (Ps. 112:5; Is. 33:5; cf. Pss. Sol. 18:10) or on Mount Zion (Ps. 67:17; Is. 8:16). Two different places.

In the two Colossians texts, however, the word is used figuratively. Jesus is not a place in which a person may dwell. He is a person.

In Jesus’ parable of the seven spirits, the person in which the spirits dwell is likened to a house, which can be swept and put in order. But obviously the relation of a “spirit” to the “possessed” person is not that literally; it is something more complex and intimate, even for an ancient anthropology, I presume. How would we understand the relation between a “holy spirit” and the person in which that spirit dwells? The boundaries between to break down.

So the question is: how does the metaphor work? More to the point, perhaps: how does the metaphor work in the rhetorical context of what appears to be a reconceptualisation of Jewish ideas in Hellenistic terms?

I don’t myself think that the issue here is how to gain access to the divine realm. That’s later theologising. After all, the exalted Lord in heaven was as remote as God was. The controlling narrative is fundamentally eschatological, it has to do with the transition from the present age to the age to come, and there are two parts to this: on the one hand, the one God of Israel is appropriating for himself the fullness of Greek notions of the divine; and on the other, this one God has defeated Greek-Roman government in the cross and has transferred to Jesus the authority to judge and rule over the nations in the age to come.

How exactly katoikei functions in this context is difficult to determine. Perhaps the best argument is still, as you suggest, that the dwelling of YHWH as King on Mount Zion has been re-imagined. But I suspect that the point is more that Jesus now embodies (sōmatikōs) in himself alone as Lord, King of kings, etc., the whole hierarchy of spiritual and earthly authorities to which the nations had previously been subject.

József X | Wed, 04/16/2025 - 00:32 | Permalink

Bühner’s assertion that morphē theou denotes merely an external appearance or sociological status strips the phrase of its theological depth. The term morphē, while not a perfect synonym for ousia (essence), is used in Philippians 2:6 to communicate a mode of existence that corresponds to divine reality. Paul is not claiming that Jesus seemed like God or appeared to have divine status, but rather that he truly existed in a divine condition — a condition from which he freely descended, not under compulsion, but in humility. That is the thrust of the hymn: not that Jesus refused to grasp something alien to himself, but that he did not exploit what was already his by right — divine equality.

Bühner’s reading not only detaches this passage from the wider context of Paul’s Christology but also imposes a modern sociological framework onto a theological hymn rooted in both Jewish and Hellenistic categories. Yes, Paul uses Hellenistic language, but he does so to convey a mystery at the heart of the gospel: that the eternal Son, existing in the divine morphē, did not regard equality with God as harpagmos — something to be exploited or clung to — but instead poured himself out. Bühner tries to maintain that this is merely an ethical example, not a reflection of divine pre-existence, yet Paul’s exhortation to humility gains its power because the descent begins from divinity. Otherwise, the model collapses into absurdity — how can a mere man imitate a demotion he never possessed? Paul’s paraenesis only works because the hymn depicts a real, historical self-humbling from divine glory to human lowliness.

Moreover, Bühner’s attempt to decouple morphē theou from ontological significance disregards the patristic consensus that recognized morphē as connoting a true sharing in divine being. Gregory of Nyssa and other early theologians understood Paul’s language as indicating the Son’s full possession of divine essence, not a mere outward appearance. Their theological reflections were not arbitrary fourth-century innovations but faithful articulations of what the Church had always read in this text. Bühner’s skepticism toward this tradition seems to stem more from modern critical distrust of metaphysics than from a robust exegesis of the Pauline corpus.

Furthermore, his reliance on Qumran parallels and Second Temple motifs is tenuous. There is little in Second Temple Judaism that supports a suffering messiah who pre-exists in divine form and voluntarily takes on servanthood — and that is precisely Paul’s point. Jesus is not merely a human messiah who humbles himself; he is the divine Son who becomes man. Bühner’s entire project is to naturalize high Christology into Jewish messianism, but Philippians 2 defies this domestication. It proclaims something scandalous and unprecedented: that God himself descended in the person of Christ, suffered, and was exalted.

@József X:

Again, a solid critique…

Bühner’s assertion that morphē theou denotes merely an external appearance or sociological status strips the phrase of its theological depth.

This looks like a classic example of reading later theological conclusions back into the text. Nothing in the passage necessitates the sort of “theological depth” that you find in it—certainly not the expression morphē theou, which is not remotely synonymous with ousia theou. To be en morphē theou cannot have meant “to be in the essence or condition of God,” and no commentator, to my knowledge, has shown how such an interpretation is lexicologically possible.

To be “in the form of” something is not to be that thing. It is not being said here that Jesus was God or a god, any more than that he was a slave. If a birthday cake is “in the form of” a dinosaur, it is not a dinosaur. It has the outward appearance of a dinosaur. If Zeus turns up in the form of a bull, he is not a bull, he is not in the essence of a bull. He has the outward appearance of a bull. To the Greek mind, Jesus, like Paul and Barnabas, had the outward appearance of a god, but he was not a god, any more than he was a slave.

There is no category of pre-existent sonship in Paul. The sonship theme begins with Jesus’ baptism and culminates in his elevation to kingly rule following the resurrection, in keeping with Old Testament terminology.

It is meaningless to say that Jesus did not seize (the core meaning of the harpazō word group) something which he already possessed. However we interpret the verbal noun, it must refer to an act of seizure, not “something to be exploited or clung on to.” If the phrase is idiomatic in the way that Hoover has described, it very naturally connotes seizing an opportunity to act fortuitously presented.

Otherwise, the model collapses into absurdity — how can a mere man imitate a demotion he never possessed?

Well, then how can Paul or the Philippians be expected to imitate Christ? If we suppose that Jesus did not exploit his charismatic power in order to gain the sort of equality with God or a god associated with ruler cults but emptied himself of selfish ambition, etc., we have a very plausible model for early Christian behaviour.

The patristic interpretations are developed in a very different polemical setting. Gregory of Nyssa, for example, discusses morphē theou as part of his rebuttal of Eunomius’ teaching about the variance between the essences of the Father and the Son. Paul’s polemical and rhetorical stance is very different. They are worlds apart. There is no historically relevant evidence to suggest that morphē theou would have been understood as a reference to the ousia of God. At least, I haven’t seen any.

The reason I press this point is not to undermine trinitarianism, which no doubt made very good sense as a Greek rationalisation of the Jewish-apostolic witness to the resurrected Jesus. What I object to is that we defend the later dogma at the expense of a historically relevant grasp of Paul’s gospel and mission, which seem to me to demand a thorough-going apocalyptic interpretation. Jesus, who was a descendant of David according to the flesh, who became a Spirit-empowered servant to the circumcised, who was executed by Rome, would eventually be confessed as Lord by the pagan nations, to the glory of the one God of the Jews.

There is little in Second Temple Judaism that supports a suffering messiah who pre-exists in divine form and voluntarily takes on servanthood — and that is precisely Paul’s point.

How do we know that it is “precisely Paul’s point” if the language he uses doesn’t mean that? Surely you are begging the question.